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Westudy f -resilient services,whichareguaranteed tooperateas longasnomore than f of the
associated processes fail. We prove three theorems asserting the impossibility of boosting
the resilience of such services. Our first theorem allows any connection pattern between
processes and services but assumes these services to be atomic (linearizable) objects. This
theorem says that no distributed system in which processes coordinate using f -resilient
atomic objects and reliable registers can solve the consensus problem in the presence of
f +1 undetectable process stopping failures. In contrast, we show that it is possible to boost
the resilience of some systems solving problems easier than consensus: for example, the
2-set consensus problem is solvable for 2n processes and 2n − 1 failures (i.e., wait-free)
using n-process consensus services resilient to n − 1 failures (wait-free). Our proof is short
and self-contained.
We then introduce the larger class of failure-oblivious services. These are services that
cannot use information about failures, although theymay behavemore flexibly than atomic
objects. An example of such a service is totally ordered broadcast. Our second theorem
generalizes the first theorem and its proof to failure-oblivious services.
Our third theorem allows the system to contain failure-aware services, such as failure
detectors, in addition to failure-oblivious services. This theorem requires that each failure-
aware service be connected to all processes; thus, f + 1 process failures overall can disable
all the failure-aware services. In contrast, it is possible to boost the resilience of a system
solving consensus using failure-aware services if arbitrary connection patterns between
processes and services are allowed: consensus is solvable for any number of failures using
only 1-resilient 2-process perfect failure detectors.
As far as we know, this is the first time a unified framework has been used to describe
both atomic andnon-atomic objects, and thefirst timeboosting analysis has beenperformed
for services more general than atomic objects.
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1. Introduction
We consider distributed systems consisting of asynchronously operating processes that coordinate using shared services
and reliable multi-writer multi-reader registers. A service is a distributed computing mechanism that interacts with dis-
tributed processes, accepting invocations, performing internal computation steps, and delivering responses. Examples of
services include:
• Shared atomic (linearizable) objects, defined by sequential type specifications [11,12], for example, atomic read-modify-
write, queue, counter, test&set, compare&swap and consensus objects.
• Concurrently-accessible data structures such as balanced trees.
• Broadcast services such as totally ordered broadcast and atomic broadcast [10].
• Failure detectors, which provide processes with information about the failure of other processes [5]. 1
Thus, our notion of a service is quite general. We define three successively more general classes of service—atomic objects,
failure-oblivious services, and general (possibly failure-aware) services—in Sections 2.1, 5, and 6. We define our services to
tolerate a certain number f of failures: a service is f -resilient if it is guaranteed to operate as long as no more than f of the
processes connected to the service fail.
This paper considers the question of what level of resilience can be achieved by distributed systems containing certain
kinds of services. In particular, we prove results saying that the resilience of a system cannot be “boosted” above that of
its individual services. More specifically, we prove three theorems saying that no distributed system in which processes
coordinate using reliable registers and f -resilient services can solve the consensus problem in the presence of f + 1 process-
stopping failures.
We focus on the consensus problem because it is fundamental to the study of resilience in distributed systems. For
example, consensus has been shown to be universal [11], in the sense that an atomic object of any sequential type can be
implemented in await-freemanner (i.e., tolerating any number of failures), using (an infinite number of)wait-free consensus
objects. In fact, the choice of consensus is crucial because our results do not apply to some problems that are weaker than
consensus, such as k-set-consensus.
Our contribution. Our first main theorem, Theorem 2, assumes that the given services are atomic objects and allows any
connection pattern between processes and services. This theorem is a strict generalization of the classical impossibility
result of Fischer et al. [8] for fault-tolerant consensus. The proof is short and self-contained. It uses a bivalence argument
inspired by (though somewhat more elaborate than) the one in [8]. The proof involves showing that decisions can be made
in a particular way, described by a hook pattern of executions.
In contrast to the impossibility of boosting for consensus, we show that it is possible to boost the resilience of systems
solving problems easier than consensus. In particular, we show that the 2-set-consensus problem is solvable for 2n processes
and 2n − 1 failures (i.e., wait-free) using n-process consensus services resilient to n − 1 failures (i.e., wait-free).
Theorem2and its proof assume that the given services are atomic objects; however, they extend to a larger class of failure-
oblivious services. A failure-oblivious service generalizes an atomic object by allowing an invocation to trigger any number
of responses, to any number of processes. The service may also perform spontaneous steps, not triggered by an invocation.
The key constraint is that no step may depend on explicit knowledge of the occurrence of failure events. We define the class
of failure-oblivious services, give an example (totally-ordered broadcast), and prove a second theorem, Theorem 9, which
extends Theorem 2 to failure-oblivious services.
Our third theorem,Theorem10, addresses thecasewhere the systemmaycontaingeneral (possibly failure-aware) services,
such as failure detectors or atomic broadcast services, in addition to failure-oblivious services and reliable registers. This
result also says that boosting is impossible. However, it requires the additional assumption that each general service is
connected to all processes; thus, f + 1 process failures overall can disable all the general services. The proof is a variant of
our second proof, again using a “hook” construction. We also show that the stronger connectivity assumption is necessary,
by demonstrating that it is possible to boost the resilience of a system solving consensus if arbitrary connection patterns
between processes and general services are allowed: specifically, consensus is solvable for any number of failures using only
1-resilient 2-process perfect failure detectors.
In addition to the threemain theorems, our paper presents (as far as we know) the first unified framework for expressing
both atomic and non-atomic objects. Our models for failure-oblivious services and general services are new. Moreover, this
is the first time boosting analysis has been performed for services more general than atomic objects.
Related work. Our Theorem 2 asserting the impossibility of boosting the resilience of atomic objects appeared initially in a
2002 technical report [2]. Subsequently, it was observed in [9,13] that a variant of Theorem 2 can be derived by combining
several earlier theorems, including Herlihy’s result on universality of consensus [11], observations on implementability of
consensus by Jayanti and Toueg [14], and results of Chandra et al. on f -resilience vs. wait-freedom [3]. However, the models
differ in some technical aspects. Some of the differences between the models are:
1 Our notion of service allows us to model some of the failure detectors defined by Chandra et al. [4]. See Section 6.2, for examples.
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1. Jayanti and Toueg [14] and Herlihy [11] assume that an access to a wait-free object takes place instantaneously, while
Chandra et al. [3] and our paper assume that an access to every service (even wait-free) incurs a delay. Also, Chandra
et al. [3] and our paper allow a process to access multiple services concurrently.
2. In our definition of an f -resilient atomic object, a connected process Pi that does not apply an invocation is considered
alive until a faili action arrives. The corresponding definition of a weakly f -resilient object in Chandra et al. [3] counts
such a process as faulty.
3. Weassume that an implementationcanuseonlyfinitelymanyservices. Chandraet al. [3]doesnotmake this assumtion.
We suspect, however, that it should not be difficult to address the points above and derive our result on atomic objects
from [3,11,14]. Nevertheless, some of the proofs upon which such an indirect derivation (sketched in [9]) may rest are more
complex than our direct proof. Also, unlike our proof, the indirect arguments do not extend to prove the impossibility of
boosting for failure-oblivious and failure-aware services.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents definitions for the underlying model of
distributed computation and for atomic objects. Section 2.2 presents our model for a system whose services are atomic
objects. Section 3 presents the first impossibility result. Section 4 shows that boosting is possible for set consensus. Section 5
defines failure-oblivious services, gives an example, and proves our second impossibility result, which extends the first
impossibility result to systemswith failure-oblivious services. Section6definesgeneral services, givesexamples, andpresents
our third impossibility result. Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A provides the complete proofs for the main lemmas
in the second impossibility result, for failure-oblivious services.
2. Mathematical preliminaries
2.1. Model of distributed computation
In this section, we review definitions for basic notions used in this paper: I/O automata and sequential types. We also
give new definitions for resilient atomic objects, in terms of I/O automata.
2.1.1. I/O Automata
We use the I/O automaton model of Lynch and Tuttle [16,18], as presented in [17, Chapter 8], as our underlying model
for concurrent computation. An I/O automaton is a state machine where each transition is labeled with an action name,
i.e., transitions are triples (s, a, s′) where s, s′ are states and a is an action name. A distinguished subset of the states are
start states. An execution is an alternating sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . . of states and actions such that s0 is a start state and
every triple si−1aisi along the execution is an actual transition. Each action of an I/O automaton is either an input action,
output action, or internal action. These three sets of actions constitute the signature of the I/O automaton. In a concurrent
composition of several I/O automata, all I/O automatawith an action a in their signaturemust execute a concurrently for a to
occur. Concurrency is thus modeled as the nondeterministic interleaving of action executions. In a concurrent composition,
an action a can be an output action of at most one automaton, and if a is an internal action of some I/O automaton, then it
cannot be an action of any other I/O automaton. I/O automata are input-enabled, that is, from every state there is at least
one transition for every input action. So, an I/O automaton has no control over the occurrence of its input actions, but does
have control over the occurrence of its output and internal actions, which are collectively referred to as locally-controlled
actions. The locally controlled actions of an I/O automaton are partitioned into tasks. We use associated terminology from
[17, Chapter 8] as needed.
We say that an I/O automaton A is deterministic if and only if, for each task e of A, and each state s of A, there is at most
one transition (s, a, s′) such that a ∈ e.
An execution α of A is fair iff for each task e of A: (1) if α is finite, then e is not enabled in the final state of α, and (2) if α is
infinite, thenα contains either infinitelymany actions of e, or infinitelymany occurrences of states in which e is not enabled.
A trace of A is a sequence of external actions of A obtained by removing the states and internal actions from an execution of
A. A trace of a fair execution is called a fair trace.
If α and α′ are execution fragments of A, with α finite, such that α′ starts in the last state of α, then the concatenation
α · α′ is defined, and is called an extension of α.
An I/O automaton A implements an I/O automaton B iff all of the following hold:
1. A and B have the same input actions and the same output actions.
2. Any (finite or infinite) trace of A is also a trace of B.
3. Any fair trace of A is also a fair trace of B.
2.1.2. Sequential types
We define the notion of a “sequential type,” in order to describe allowable sequential behavior of atomic objects. The
definition used here generalizes the one in [17, Chapter 9]: here, we allow nondeterminism in the choice of the initial state
and the next state. Namely, sequential type T = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, δ〉 consists of:
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• V , a nonempty set of values,
• V0 ⊆ V , a nonempty set of initial values,• invs, a set of invocations,
• resps, a set of responses, and
• δ, a binary relation from invs × V to resps × V that is total, in the sense that, for every (a, v) ∈ invs × V , there is at least
one (b, v′) ∈ resps × V such that ((a, v), (b, v′)) ∈ δ. 2 Relation δ specifies, for each invocation and each value of the
type, a response and a new value.
We sometimes use “dot” notation, writing T .V, T .V0, T .invs, etc. for the components of T .
We say that T is deterministic if V0 is a singleton set {v0}, and δ is a mapping, that is, for every (a, v) ∈ invs × V , there is
exactly one (b, v′) ∈ resps × V such that ((a, v), (b, v′)) ∈ δ.
We allow nondeterminism in our definition of a sequential type in order to make our notion of “service” as general as
possible. In particular, the problem of k-set-consensus can be specified using a nondeterministic sequential type, but not a
deterministic sequential type.
Example. Read/write sequential type: Here, V is a set of “values”, V0 = {v0}, where v0 is a distinguished element of V ,
invs = {read} ∪ {write(v) : v ∈ V}, resps = V ∪ {ack}, and δ = {((read, v), (v, v)) : v ∈ V} ∪ {((write(v), v′), (ack, v)) :
v, v′ ∈ V}. This is a deterministic sequential type.
Example. Binary consensus sequential type: Here, V = {{0}, {1},∅}, V0 = {∅}, (invs = {init(v)) : v ∈ {0, 1}}, resps ={decide(v) : v ∈ {0, 1}}, and δ = {((init(v),∅), (decide(v), {v})) : v ∈ {0, 1}} ∪ {((init(v), {v′}), (decide(v′), {v′})) : v, v′ ∈
{0, 1}}. Thus, the first value is remembered, and is returned by every operation. This is also a deterministic sequential type.
Example. k-set-consensus sequential type, 0 < k < n: Now V is the set of subsets of {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} having at most
k elements, V0 = {∅}, invs = {init(v) : v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}}, resps = {decide(v) : v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}}, and
δ = {((init(v),W), (decide(v′),W∪{v})) : |W| < k, v′ ∈ W∪{v}} ∪ {((init(v),W), (decide(v′),W)) : |W| = k, v′ ∈ W}.
Thus, thefirst k values are remembered, and every operation returns oneof these values. This is a nondeterministic sequential
type.
2.1.3. Canonical f -resilient atomic objects
Next,we define f -resilient atomic objects. For our impossibility proofs, it is convenient tomodel such objects as automata,
and to express the f -resilience condition within the automata themselves, rather than treating it as a separate constraint.
A “canonical” f -resilient atomic object is an I/O automaton that exhibits all the allowable behavior, including concurrent
behavior, that is permitted for an f -resilient atomic object. Namely, we define the canonical f -resilient atomic object of type
T for endpoint set J and index k, where
• T is a sequential type,
• J is a nonempty finite set of endpoints at which invocations and responses may occur, (an endpoint is just a process index,
i.e., the endpoints define the processes that can invoke operations on the atomic object)
• f ∈ N is the level of resilience, and
• k is a unique index for the service.
The object is described as an I/O automaton, in precondition/effect notation, in Fig. 1.
We will use the parameter J to specify which processes are connected to the object; see Section 2.2. The parameter J
allows different objects to be connected to the same set or different sets of processes. A process at endpoint i ∈ J can
issue any invocation specified by the underlying sequential type T and can (potentially) receive any allowable response. We
allow concurrent (overlapping) operations, at the same or different endpoints. The object preserves the order of concurrent
invocations at the same endpoint i by keeping the invocations and responses in internal FIFO buffers, two per endpoint (one
for invocations from the endpoint, the other for responses to the endpoint). The object chooses the result of an operation
nondeterministically, from the set of results allowed by the transition relation T .δ applied to the invocation and the current
value of val. The object can exhibit nondeterminismdue to nondeterminismof the sequential type T , and due to interleavings
of steps for different process invocations.
Wemodel a failure at an endpoint i by an explicit input action faili.We use the task structure of I/O automata and the basic
definition of fair executions to specify the required resilience. Namely, for every process i ∈ J, we assume the object has two
tasks, whichwe call the i-perform task and i-output task. The i-perform task includes the performi,k action, which carries out
operations invoked at endpoint i. The i-output task includes all the bi,k actions giving responses at endpoint i. In addition,
every i-perform or i-output task contains a special dummy_performi,k or dummy_outputi,k action, which is enabled when
either process i has failed or strictly more than f processes in J have failed. The dummy_performi,k and dummy_outputi,k
actions are intended to allow, but not force, the object to stop performing steps on behalf of process i after i fails or after the
resilience level has been exceeded.
2 We also write δ((a, v), (b, v′)) for ((a, v), (b, v′)) ∈ δ.
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Fig. 1. A canonical atomic object.
The definition of fairness for I/O automata says that each taskmust get infinitely many turns to take steps. In this context,
this implies that, for every i ∈ J, the object eventually responds to an outstanding invocation at i, unless either i fails or more
than f processes in J fail. If i does fail or more than f processes in J fail, the fairness definition allows the object to perform
the dummy_performi,k action every time the i-perform task gets a turn, and to perform the dummy_outputi,k action every
time the i-output task gets a turn, thereby avoiding responding to i. In particular, if more than f processes fail, the object
may avoid responding to any process in J, since dummy_outputi,k is enabled for every i ∈ J. Also, if all processes connected
to the object (i.e., all processes in J) fail, the object may avoid responding to any process.
Thus, the basic fairness definition for I/O automata, applied to a canonical f -resilient atomic object automaton, expresses
the idea that the object is f -resilient: once more than f of the processes connected to the object fail, the object itself may
“fail” by becoming silent. However, although the object may stop responding, it never violates its safety guarantees, that is,
it never returns values inconsistent with the underlying sequential type specification.
We say that a canonical f -resilient atomic object automaton A is wait-free (or, reliable), if it is (|J| − 1)-resilient. This
is equivalent to saying that (a) A is |J|-resilient, or (b) A is f -resilient for some f ≥ |J| − 1, or (c) A is f -resilient for every
f ≥ |J| − 1.
A canonical atomic object whose sequential type is read/write is called a canonical register. In this paper, we will assume
canonical reliable (wait-free) registers.
2.1.4. f -Resilient atomic objects
An I/O automaton A is an f -resilient atomic object of type T for nonempty endpoint set J and index k, provided that it
implements the canonical f -resilient atomic object S of type T for J and k. Here, “implements” is defined as in Section 2.1.1,
in terms of the same external interface, inclusion of trace sets, and inclusion of fair trace sets. Note that clause 2 (any trace
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of A is also a trace of S) guarantees the atomicity of A, and clause 3 (any fair trace of A is also a fair trace of S) guarantees the
f -resilience of A.
We say that A iswait-free (or, reliable), if it is (|J| − 1)-resilient. An atomic object whose sequential type is read/write is
called a register.
The notion of an f -resilient atomic object is useful when we talk about a distributed system implementing a specific
canonical service. In this case, we can say that the system is the service. This enables composition of implementations: an
implemented service can be seen as a canonical service in a higher-level implementation.
2.2. System model with atomic objects
Our system model consists of a collection of process automata, canonical resilient atomic objects, and canonical reli-
able registers. For this section, we fix I, R, and K , (disjoint) finite index sets for processes, registers, and resilient atomic
objects, respectively, and T , a sequential type, representing the problem the system is intended to solve. A distributed sys-
tem for I, R, K , and T is the composition of the following I/O automata (see [17, Chapter 8] for the formal definition of
composition):
1. Processes Pi, i ∈ I,
2. Resilient atomic objects Sk , k ∈ K . We let Tk denote the sequential type, and Jk ⊆ I the set of endpoints, of object Sk .
We let fk denote the level of resilience. We assume k itself is the index for the object, as in the definition of a canonical
atomic object.
3. Reliable registers Sr , r ∈ R. We let Vr denote the value set and (v0)r the initial value for register Sr . We let Jr ⊆ I denote
the set of endpoints of register Sr . We assume r is the index for the register.
We assume that processes interact only via registers and resilient atomic objects. Process Pi can invoke an operation on
resilient atomic object Sk provided that i ∈ Jk. Process Pi can also invoke a read or write operation on register Sr provided
that i ∈ Jr . Services (resilient atomic objects and registers) do not communicate directly with one another, but may interact
indirectly via processes. In the remainder of this section, we describe the components inmore detail and define terminology
needed for the results and proofs.
2.2.1. Processes
We assume that process Pi, i ∈ I has the following interface (inputs and outputs):
• Inputs ai, a ∈ T .invs, and outputs bi, b ∈ T .resps. These represent Pi’s interactions with the external world.• For every resilient atomic object Sk such that i ∈ Jk, outputs ai,k , where a ∈ invsk , and inputs bi,k , where b ∈ respsk .• For every reliable register Sr such that i ∈ Jr , outputs ai,r , where a is a (read or write) invocation of Sr , and inputs bi,r ,
where b is a response of Sr .• Input faili. This represents the failure of process Pi.
Pi may issue several invocations, on the same or different registers or resilient atomic objects, without waiting for
responses to previous invocations. The external world at Pi may also issue several invocations to Pi without waiting for
responses.
In the special case where Pi is part of an implementation of consensus or k-set-consensus, we assume, as a technicality
for the proofs, that when Pi performs a decide(v)i output action, it records the decision value v in a special state component
(see Section 2.2.4 for the formal definition of the consensus problem).
We assume that Pi has only a single task, which therefore consists of all the locally controlled actions of Pi. We assume
that in every state, some action in that single task is enabled. This action might be a “dummy” action, as in the canonical
resilient atomic objects defined in Section 2.1.3. We assume that the faili input action affects Pi in such a way that, from the
point of the failure onward, no output actions of Pi are enabled. However, other locally controlled actionsmay be enabled—in
fact, by the restriction just above, some such actionmust be enabled.
We do not make any other restrictions on when Pi may perform actions, for example, we do not insist that Pi take “non-
dummy” steps only during certain intervals defined by external invocations and responses. Our impossibility proofs do not
depend on this assumption. On the other hand, when devising implementations of atomic objects, we will typically prefer
algorithms in which processes are active only during intervals between invocations and responses.
2.2.2. Resilient atomic objects and registers
Weassume that resilient atomic object Sk is the canonical fk-resilient atomic object of type Tk = 〈Vk, (V0)k, invsk, respsk,
δk〉 for Jk and k.
We assume that register Sr is the canonical wait-free atomic read/write object with value set Vr and initial value (v0)r ,
for Jr and r. We write invsr , respsr , and δr for the invocations, responses, and transition relation of Sr .
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2.2.3. The complete system
The complete system C is constructed by composing the Pi, Sr , and Sk automata in parallel and then hiding the actions
used to communicate among these automata. Our parallel composition and hiding operations are the standard I/O automata
operations defined in [17, Chapter 8].
When we compose the automata, invocation outputs of process Pi of the form ai,c , c ∈ K ∪ R, “match up” with corre-
sponding invocation inputs of service Sc , and similarly for responses. Also, a faili input is both an input to process Pi and an
input to every service Sc for which i is an endpoint, i ∈ Jc . Thus, faili both causes Pi to fail and allows each service Sc for which
i ∈ Jc to stop processing on behalf of Pi. It also adds to the tally of failures recorded by Sc .
We now consider tasks in the composed system. As we specified earlier, each process Pi has a single task, consisting of
all the locally controlled actions of Pi. Each service Sc , c ∈ K ∪ R, has two tasks for each i ∈ Jc: i-perform, consisting of{performi,k, dummy_performi,k}, and i-output, consisting of {bi,k : b ∈ respsk} ∪ {dummy_outputi,k}. These tasks define a
partition of the set of all actions in the system, except for the inputs of the process automata that are not outputs of any
other automata, namely, the invocations by the external world and the faili actions. The I/O automata fairness assumption
says that each of these tasks gets infinitely many turns to execute.
We say that a task e is applicable to a finite execution α iff some action of e is enabled in the last state of α. The following
lemma says that any applicable task remains applicable until an action in that task occurs.
Lemma 1. Let α be any finite failure-free execution of C, e be any task of C applicable to α, and α · β be any finite failure-free
extension of α such that β includes no actions of e. Then e is applicable to α · β .
Proof. Task e is either a process task or service (resilient atomic object or register) task. If e is a process task, then e is
applicable to any finite execution, by our assumption that each process always has some enabled locally controlled action.
If e is a service task, say of service Sc , c ∈ K ∪ R, then applicability of e to α means that service Sc has either a pending
invocation in an inv−buffer or a pending response in a resp−buffer, immediately after α. Since β does not include any
actions of e, and the invocation or response remains pending as long as e is not scheduled, e is also applicable to α · β . 
For any action a of C and any automaton Pi, Sk , or Sr , we say that the automaton participates in a if it has a in its signature.
For any action a of C, we define the participants of a to be the set of automata that participate in a. Note that no two
distinct services (resilient atomic objects or registers) participate in the same action, and similarly no two distinct processes
participate in the same action. Furthermore, for any action a (except faili actions), the number of participants is at most two.
Thus, if an action a has two participants, they must be a process and a service.
2.2.4. Solving the f -resilient consensus problem
Now we can describe what it means for a distributed system to solve the f -resilient consensus problem. The traditional
specification of f -resilient binary consensus is given in terms of a set {Pi, i ∈ I} of processes, each of which starts with some
value vi in {0, 1}. Processes are subject to stopping failures, which prevent them from producing any further output. 3 As a
result of engaging in a consensus algorithm, each nonfaulty process eventually “decides” on a value from {0, 1}. The behavior
of processes is required to satisfy the following conditions (see, e.g., [17, Chapter 6]):
Agreement. No two processes decide on different values.
Validity. Any value decided on is the initial value of some process.
Termination. In every fair execution in which at most f processes fail, all nonfaulty processes eventually decide.
In this paper, we specify the consensus problem differently, following a style similar to that of Herlihy [11]. Namely, we
identify the f -resilient binary consensus problem for a given endpoint set I with the canonical f -resilient atomic object of
type consensus, for endpoint set I. We say that a distributed system C solves f -resilient consensus for I if and only if C is an
f -resilient atomic object (as defined in Section 2.1.4) of sequential type binary consensus, 4 for endpoint set I, that is, if C
implements the canonical f -resilient atomicobject of typeconsensus, for endpoint set I. This definition formulates consensus
as a special case of an atomic object, and thus fits consensus within the framework of this paper. In [2], we showed that
any system that satisfies our definition satisfies a slight variant of the traditional one. In this variant, inputs arrive explicitly
via init() actions, not all nonfaulty processes need receive inputs, and only nonfaulty processes that do receive inputs are
guaranteed to eventually decide. Our agreement and validity conditions are the same as above. Our modified termination
condition is:
Modified termination. In every fair execution in which at most f processes fail, any nonfaulty process that receives an input
eventually decides.
3 Stopping failures are usually defined as disabling the process from executing at all. However, the two definitions are equivalent with respect to overall system
behavior.
4 We use consensus for binary consensus in the sequel.
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Thus, althoughwehavedefined “solving consensus” formally in termsof canonical atomic objects,wewill use the agreement,
validity, and modified termination conditions freely in our impossibility proofs. Appendix B summarizes the proof from [2]
that our “operational” definition implies this variant of the usual traditional axiomatic definition.
3. Impossibility of boosting for atomic objects
Our first theorem is:
Theorem 2. Let I be a set of endpoints, n = |I|, and let f be an integer such that 0 ≤ f < n − 1. There is no distributed system
using only canonical f -resilient atomic objects and canonical reliable registers that solves (f + 1)-resilient binary consensus for I.
To prove Theorem 2, we assume that such an implementation exists and derive a contradiction. Let C denote the com-
plete system, that is, the composition of the processes Pi, i ∈ I, resilient atomic objects Sk , k ∈ K , and reliable regis-
ters Sr , r ∈ R. Here I, K , and R are sets of indices that we use to provide unique names for each process, service, and
register, respectively. By assumption, C implements an (f + 1)-resilient consensus atomic object. As described in Sec-
tion2.2.4, this implies thatC satisfies the traditional agreement andvalidityproperties of consensus, and thenewtermination
property.
For each component index c ∈ K ∪ R and each i ∈ Jc (recall that Jc denotes the endpoints of c), let inv−buffer(i)c denote
the invocation buffer of c, which stores invocations from Pi, and let resp−buffer(i)c denote the response buffer of c, which
stores responses to Pi. Also let buffer(i)c denote the pair 〈inv−buffer(i)c, resp−buffer(i)c〉.
The rest of this section provides the proof of Theorem 2, as follows. Section 3.1 presents and justifies an assumption
that processes and sequential types are deterministic. This assumption simplies our proofs. Section 3.2 defines a class of
executions of C, the finite failure-free input-first executions, that we will use in the proof, and establishes some preliminary
valence results for this class of executions. Section 3.3 defines a graph G(C) that gives relationships among the finite failure-
free input-first executions of C. It can be regarded as a transition graph. Section 3.4 shows that G(C) contains a “hook,”
similarly to [8], with two endpoints of opposite valence (see Fig. 2). Section 3.5 defines two similarity notions for system
states: states that are “similar” except for one process, or except for one atomic service. It then presents two lemmas, one
for each notion of similarity, which state that univalent finite failure-free input-first executions that end in similar states
must have the same valence. Section 3.6 then uses these lemmas to show that G(C) cannot contain a hook, which alongwith
Section 3.4 provides the desired contradiction. The proof uses the failure of the distinguished process or atomic service to
show that the two endpoints of the hook must have the same valence.
3.1. Determinism assumptions
To prove Theorem 2, we add determinism assumptions for processes and services. These are without loss of generality.
First, we require the processes to be deterministic:
(i) Each process Pi, i ∈ I, is a deterministic automaton, as defined in Section 2.1.1.
For resilient atomic objects, we assume a slightly weaker condition:
(ii) Each resilient atomic object Sk , k ∈ K , has a deterministic sequential type; that is, the sequential type Tk has a unique
initial value (v0)k and the transition relation δk is a mapping.
Note that the sequential type for each register is also deterministic, by definition. Assumptions (i) and (ii) do not reduce
the generality of our impossibility result, because any candidate system could be restricted, by removing transitions, to
satisfy these assumptions. If the impossibility result holds for the restricted automaton, then it holds also for the original
one.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that, after a finite failure-free execution α, an applicable task e determines a unique
transition, arising from running task e from the final state s of α. We denote this transition using the function nota-
tion transition(e, α), or alternatively, transition(e, s), since it is uniquely determined by the final state s of α. Note that
transition(e, α) is defined iff e is applicable to α iff (some action in) e is enabled in s. As a result, any failure-free execution
can be generated by applying a sequence of applicable tasks, one after the other, to the initial state of C. The task sequence
is enough to uniquely specify the execution.
If transition(e, α) = (s, a, s′), then we write action(e, s) to denote a, and e(s) to denote s′. We write e(α) to denote α
extended by transition(e, α), that is, e(α) = α · (s, a, s′).
Let s be any state of C arising after a finite failure-free execution α of C, and let e be a task that is applicable to α
(equivalently, enabled in s). Then we write participants(e, s) for the set of participants of action action(e, s). Note that, for
any task e and any state s, |participants(e, s)| ≤ 2. Also, if |participants(e, s)| = 2, then participants(e, s) is of the form
{Pi, Sc}, for some i ∈ I and c ∈ K ∪ R.
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3.2. Initializations and valence
Our proof follows a general strategy inspired by, though somewhat more elaborate than, the one in [8] and [15]. As
in [8,15], the first step of the proof is to produce a bivalent initial configuration.
We consider executions of C in which consensus inputs arrive from the external world at the beginning of the execution.
Thus, we define an initialization of C to be a finite execution of C containing exactly one init()i action for each i ∈ I, and no
other actions. An execution α of C is input-first if it has an initialization as a prefix, and contains no other init() actions. A
finite failure-free input-first execution α is defined to be 0-valent if (1) some failure-free extension of α contains a decide(0)i
action, for some i ∈ I, and (2) no failure-free extension of α contains a decide(1)i action, for any i ∈ I. The definition of a
1-valent execution is symmetric. A finite failure-free input-first execution α is univalent if it is either 0-valent or 1-valent.
A finite failure-free input-first execution α is bivalent if (1) some failure-free extension of α contains a decide(0)i action, for
some i, and (2) some failure-free extension ofα contains a decide(1)i action, for some i. These definitions, and the termination
requirements for consensus, immediately imply the following result:
Lemma 3. Every finite failure-free input-first execution of C is either bivalent or univalent.
The following lemma provides the first step of the impossibility proof:
Lemma 4. C has a bivalent initialization.
Proof. Write I = {1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let αi be an initialization of C in which processes P1, . . . , Pi receive
initial value 1 and processes Pi+1, . . . , Pn receive 0. By the validity property of C and Lemma 3, α0 is 0-valent, αn is 1-valent,
and every αj (j ∈ {0, . . . , n}) is either univalent or bivalent.
Then there must be some index i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} such that αi is 0-valent and αi+1 is either 1-valent or bivalent. The
only difference between the initializations in αi and αi+1 is the initial value of Pi. So consider a failure-free extension of αi
that is fair, except that Pi takes no steps. Since this execution looks to the rest of the system like an execution in which Pi has
failed, the termination condition requires that the other processes must eventually decide, as C is (f + 1)-resilient, f ≥ 0.
Since the finite execution up to the point where the processes decide is in fact failure-free, and αi is 0-valent, the decision
must be 0.
Now, an analogous failure-free extensionmaybe constructed forαi+1, also leading to adecisionof 0. Since, by assumption,
αi+1 is either 1-valent or bivalent, it must be bivalent. 
For the rest of Section 3, fix αb to be any particular bivalent initialization of C.
3.3. The graph G(C)
Next, we define an edge-labeled directed acyclic graph (actually, a directed tree) G(C) to represent relationships among
finite failure-free input-first executions of C:
(1) The vertices of G(C) are the finite failure-free input-first extensions of the bivalent initialization αb.
(2) G(C) contains an edge labeled with task e from α to α′ provided that α′ = e(α); that is, e is applicable to α and α′ is
the resulting extended execution.
By assumptions (i) and (ii) of Section 3.1, any task triggers atmost one transition after a failure-free executionα. Therefore,
for any vertex α of G(C) and any task e, G(C) contains at most one edge labeled with e outgoing from α.
3.4. The existence of a hook
As in [8], we show that decisions in C can bemade in a particular way, described by a hook pattern of executions. Similarly
to [4], we define a hook to be a subgraph of G(C) of the form depicted in Fig. 2. That is, from a particular finite failure-free
input-first execution α, one applicable task e leads to a 0-valent extension α0, whereas a second applicable task e
′ leads to
an extension α′, from which the first task e leads to a 1-valent extension α1.
Lemma 5. G(C) contains a hook.
Proof. The proof is derived from the corresponding one in [8], with significant modifications reflecting the applicability of
tasks in C.
Starting from the bivalent vertex αb of G(C), we generate a path π in G(C) that passes through bivalent vertices only, as
follows. We consider all tasks in a round-robin fashion. Suppose we have reached a bivalent execution α so far, and task e is
the next task in the round-robin list that is applicable to α. (We know such a task exists because the process tasks are always
applicable.)
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Fig. 2. A hook starting in α.
Fig. 3. Hook location in G(C).
Lemma 1 implies that, for any finite failure-free extension α′ of α such that e is not executed in the suffix of α′ starting
in the last state of α, e is applicable to α′, and hence e(α′) is defined. In other words, e is applicable to α′ for any vertex α′
of G(C) that is reachable from α in G(C) via a path that contains no edge labeled with e. We seek such a vertex α′ such that
e(α′) is bivalent. If no such vertex α′ exists, the path construction terminates. Otherwise, we proceed to e(α′) and continue
by processing the next task in the round-robin order. This construction is presented in Fig. 3. Each completed iteration of
the loop extends the path by at least one edge. Let π be the path generated by this construction.
First, suppose that π is infinite. Then π corresponds to a fair failure-free input-first execution α of C. Moreover, every
finite input-first prefix of α is bivalent. Thus, no process can decide in α (for otherwise, the agreement property of C would
be violated). This contradicts the termination requirement for consensus. So π must be finite.
Letα be the last vertex ofπ . By construction,α is bivalent. The fact that the path construction terminated inαmeans that
there must be some particular task e (the next one in the round-robin order that is applicable to α) satisfying the following
condition: For any descendantα′ ofα inG(C) such that the path fromα toα′ includes no e labels, e(α′) is univalent.Without
loss of generality, assume that e(α) is 0-valent.
Since α is bivalent, there is a descendant α′ of α in which some process decides 1. Let σ0, . . . , σm be the sequence of
vertices of G(C) on the path from α to α′, where σ0 = α and σm = α′. For each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, let ej be the label of the
edge on this path from σj to σj+1. Thus, σj+1 = ej(σj). Note that it is possible that e occurs as a label on the path from α to
α′; that is, one or more of the ej labels may be equal to e.
We consider two cases. First, suppose that e does not occur on the path from α to α′. Then e is applicable to every σj ,
0 ≤ j ≤ m, by Lemma 1. By construction, e(σ0) is 0-valent, e(σm) is 1-valent, and every e(σj), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, is
univalent. Thus, there exists an index j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} such that e(σj) is 0-valent and e(σj+1) is 1-valent. As a result, we
obtain a hook (Fig. 2) with e in the hook equal to e in this proof, α = σj , α′ = σj+1, α0 = e(σj), α1 = e(σj+1), and e′ = ej .
Second, suppose that e does occur on the path from α to α′. By our determinism assumptions (Section 3.1), the task e0
labeling the first edge on this path is not e. Choose k to be the smallest index such that ek = e; then 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. Then
e is applicable to every σj , 0 ≤ j ≤ k, again by Lemma 1. We know that e(σ0) is 0-valent and every e(σj), j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, is
univalent. Furthermore, e(σk) = σk+1 must be 1-valent, because α′, in which someone decides 1, is a descendant of σk+1.
Thus, there exists an index j ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1} such that e(σj) is 0-valent and e(σj+1) is 1-valent. From this, we can construct
a hook as in the first case. 
3.5. Similarity
In this section,wedefine somenotions of similarity between systemstates. Thesewill be used in obtaining a contradiction
to the existence of a hook, which will yield our impossibility result.
Our similarity definitions capturewhat it means for system states to “look the same” to all system components except for
one particular process j, or to all components except for one resilient atomic object k. The first of these notions was present
implicitly in the proof of [8], but not extracted formally; the second is new here. We prove two lemmas about our similarity
definitions, showing that similar states must lead to the same decision value. Our lemmas about similarity encapsulate
reasoning about executions and valence, so that the main proof can focus exclusively on what happens in a few individual
steps.
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First, we define j-similar system states, for a process index j. Let j ∈ I and let s0 and s1 be states of C. Then s0 and s1 are
j-similar if the following hold:
(1) For every i ∈ I − {j}, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(2) For every c ∈ K ∪ R:
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1.
2. For every i ∈ Jc − {j}, the value of buffer(i)c is the same in s0 and s1.
That is, the state of every process except for Pj is the same in s0 and s1, and the state of every service is also the same,
except possibly for the portions of the services devoted to invocations and responses of j. The following key lemma says that,
if two univalent executions end in j-similar states, for any particular j, then they must have the same valence.
Lemma 6. Let j ∈ I. Let α0 and α1 be finite failure-free input-first executions, s0 and s1 the respective final states of α0 and α1.
Suppose that s0 and s1 are j-similar. If α0 and α1 are univalent, then they have the same valence.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Fix j, α0, α1, s0, and s1 as in the hypotheses of the lemma, and suppose (without loss
of generality) that α0 is 0-valent and α1 is 1-valent. Let J ⊆ I be any set of indices such that j ∈ J and |J| = f + 1 (recall that
f is the resilience of the services in the system, as defined in the statement of Theorem 2). Since f < n − 1 by assumption,
we have |J| < n, and so I − J is nonempty. 5
Consider a fair extension of α0, α0 · β , in which the first f + 1 actions of β are faili, i ∈ J, and no other fail actions occur
in β . Note that, for every i ∈ J, β contains no output actions of Pi. Assume that in β , no performi,c or bi,c (b ∈ respsc) action
for any i ∈ J, occurs at any component c ∈ K ∪ R; we may assume this because, for each i ∈ J, action faili enables a dummy
action in every i-perform and i-output task of every service.
Since α0 is a failure-free input-first execution, the resulting extension α0 · β is a fair input-first execution containing
f + 1 fail actions. Therefore, by the termination property for (f + 1)-resilient consensus and the fact that I − J is nonempty,
there is a finite prefix of α0 · β , which we denote by α0 · γ , that includes decide(v)l for some l /∈ J and v ∈ {0, 1}. Construct
α0 · γ ′, where γ ′ is obtained from γ by removing the faili action and all subsequent internal actions of Pi, for every i ∈ J,
plus all dummy actions. Thus, α0 · γ ′ is a failure-free extension of α0 that includes decide(v)l (it is failure-free since all the
faili actions have been removed). Since α0 is 0-valent, vmust be equal to 0.
Next, we claim that decide(0)l occurs in the suffix γ
′, rather than in the prefix α0. Suppose for contradiction that the
decide(0)l action occurs in the prefix α0. Then by our technical assumption about processes, the decision value 0 is recorded
in the state of Pl . Since s0 and s1 are j-similar and l = j, the same decision value 0 appears in the state s1. But this contradicts
the assumption that α1, which ends in s1, is 1-valent. So, it must be that the decide(0)l occurs in the suffix γ
′.
Nowwe show how to append “essentially” the same γ ′ afterα1. The definition of j-similarity and the fact that j ∈ J imply
that:
(a) For every i /∈ J, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(b) For every c ∈ K ∪ R,
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1 (that is, in the final states of α0 and α1).
2. For every i ∈ Jc − J, the value of buffer(i)c is the same in s0 and s1.
We know that, for every i ∈ J, γ ′ contains no locally controlled actions of Pi, and contains no performi,c or bi,c actions
(b ∈ respsc), for any c ∈ K ∪ R. Therefore:
(c) If γ ′ contains any locally controlled actions of a process Pi, then the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1 (since i /∈ J in this
case).
(d) For every c ∈ K ∪ R,
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1.
2. For every i ∈ Jc , if γ ′ contains any performi,c or bi,c (b ∈ resps) actions, then the value of buffer(i)c is the same in s0
and s1 (since i /∈ J in this case).
It follows that it is possible to append “essentially” the same γ ′ after α1, resulting in a failure-free extension of α1 that
includes decide(0)l . Since α1 is 1-valent, this is a contradiction.
6 
5 The choice of J could be slightly simpler in this proof; we chose it in this way to facilitate the extension to the failure-aware case.
6 More precisely, we append another execution fragment γ ′′ after α1—the one that is generated by applying, after α1, the same sequence ρ of tasks that
generates γ ′ . We can prove, by induction on the number of tasks, that when ρ is applied after α0 and α1, in each pair of corresponding states: (a) for each i ∈ I
for which the unique task of Pi occurs in ρ , the states of Pi are the same, (b) for each c ∈ K ∪ R, the values of valc are the same, and (c) for each c ∈ K ∪ R and
each i ∈ Jc such that an i-perform or i-output task of Sc occurs in ρ , the values of buffer(i)c are the same. This correspondence is enough to imply that γ ′′ also
includes the required decide(0)l action.
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Similarly, we define the notion of k-similar states, for a resilient atomic object k. Let k ∈ K , and let s0 and s1 be states of
C. Then s0 and s1 are k-similar if the following hold:
(1) For every i ∈ I, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(2) For every c ∈ (K − {k}) ∪ R, the state of Sc is the same in s0 and s1.
That is, the state of every process is the same in s0 and s1, and the state of every service except for Sk is also the same.
The following lemma says that, if two univalent executions end in k-similar states, for any particular k, then they must have
the same valence.
Lemma 7. Let k ∈ K. Let α0 and α1 be finite failure-free input-first executions, s0 and s1 the respective final states of α0 and α1.
Suppose that s0 and s1 are k-similar. If α0 and α1 are univalent, then they have the same valence.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Fix k, α0, α1, s0, and s1 as in the hypotheses of the lemma, and suppose (without loss
of generality) that α0 is 0-valent and α1 is 1-valent. Let J ⊆ I be any set of indices such that |J| = f + 1, and, if |Jk| ≤ f + 1,
then Jk ⊆ J, whereas if |Jk| > f + 1, then J ⊆ Jk.
Consider a fair extension of α0, α0 · β , in which the first f + 1 actions of β are faili, i ∈ J, and no other fail actions occur
in β . Note that, for every i ∈ J, β contains no output actions of Pi. Assume that in β , no performi,k or bi,k action (b ∈ respsc)
of Sk occurs; we may assume this because the f + 1 fail actions enable dummy actions in the i-perform and i-output tasks
of Sk .
To see this enabling property, we consider the two cases in our choice of J. First, if |Jk| ≤ f + 1, then Jk ⊆ J; that is, the
f +1 fail actions fail all the endpoints of Sk . This implies that the i ∈ failed clauses in the preconditions for dummy_performi,k
and dummy_outputi,k are satisfied, for every i. On the other hand, if |Jk| > f + 1, then J ⊆ Jk; that is, all of the f + 1
failed indices are endpoints of Sk . This implies that the |failed| > f clauses in the preconditions for dummy_performi,k and
dummy_outputi,k are satisfied, for every i.
Since α0 is a failure-free input-first execution, the resulting extension α0 · β is a fair input-first execution containing
f + 1 fail actions. Therefore, by the termination property for f + 1-resilient consensus and the fact that I − J is nonempty,
there is a finite prefix of α0 · β , which we denote by α0 · γ , that includes decide(v)l for some l /∈ J and v ∈ {0, 1}. Construct
α0 · γ ′, where γ ′ is obtained from γ by removing the faili action and subsequent internal actions of Pi, for every i ∈ J, plus
all dummy actions. Thus, α0 ·γ ′ is a failure-free extension of α0 that includes decide(v)l . Since α0 is 0-valent, vmust be equal
to 0.
We know that decide(0)l occurs in the suffix γ
′, rather than in the prefix α0, by the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 6.
Now we show how to append essentially the same γ ′ after α1. The definition of k-similarity implies that:
(a) For every i ∈ I, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(b) For every c ∈ (K − {k}) ∪ R, the state of Sc is the same in s0 and s1.
We know that γ ′ contains no locally controlled actions of service Sk . Therefore:
(c) For every c ∈ K ∪ R, if γ ′ contains any performi,c or bi,c actions of Sc , then the state of Sc is the same in s0 and s1 (since
c = k in this case).
By properties (a) and (c), it follows that it is possible to append “essentially” the same γ ′ after α1 (differing only in the
state of Sk) resulting in a failure-free extension of α1 that includes decide(0)l . But α1 is 1-valent—a contradiction. 
3.6. The non-existence of a hook
Using the similarity notions developed in Section 3.5, we can now obtain the contradiction that proves our impossi-
bility result. The contradiction comes in the form of a proof that G(C) cannot contain any hooks; this directly contradicts
Lemma 5.
Lemma 8. G(C) contains no hooks.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that a hook, as depicted in Fig. 2, exists. Let s, s′, s0, and s1 be the respective final states of
α, α′, α0, and α1, and let e and e′ be the two tasks involved in the hook, as shown.
Since α0 and α1 are 0-valent and 1-valent, respectively, by Lemmas 6 and 7, s0 and s1 cannot be j-similar for any j ∈ I, or
k-similar for any k ∈ K . In particular, we cannot have s0 = s1. Also, note that e′(α0) is 0-valent, since it is an extension of a
0-valent execution. Therefore, again, by Lemmas 6 and 7, e′(s0) and s1 cannot be j-similar for any j ∈ I, or k-similar for any
k ∈ K . In particular, we cannot have e′(s0) = s1.
P. Attie et al. / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 927–950 939
We establish the contradiction using a series of claims:
Claim 1: e = e′.
Suppose for contradiction that e = e′. Then by determinism (Assumptions (i) and (ii) in Section 3.1), we have α0 = α′.
However, α0 is 0-valent, whereas α
′ has a 1-valent failure-free extension α1—a contradiction.
Claim 1 and Lemma 1 imply that e′ is enabled from e(s).
Claim 2: participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s) = ∅.
Suppose for contradiction that participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s) = ∅. Therefore, the two tasks “commute”, that is,
e′(e(s)) = e(e′(s)). In other words, e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
Since participants(e, s)∩participants(e′, s) = ∅, a process, resilient atomic object, or registermust be in the intersection.
We prove three claims showing that none of these possibilities can hold, thus obtaining the needed contradiction.
Claim 3: There does not exist i ∈ I such that Pi ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s).
Suppose for contradiction that Pi ∈ participants(e, s)∩ participants(e′, s), for some particular i ∈ I. Then the two actions
action(e, s) and action(e′, s) involve only Pi and the buffers buffer(i)c , c ∈ K ∪R. Furthermore (since the same task e is used),
the action action(e, s′) also involves only Pi and the buffers buffer(i)c , c ∈ K ∪ R. But then the states s0 and s1 can differ only
in the state of Pi and in the values of buffer(i)c , c ∈ K ∪ R. This implies that s0 and s1 are i-similar—a contradiction.
Claim 4: There does not exist k ∈ K such that Sk ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s).
Suppose for contradiction that Sk ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s), for some particular k ∈ K . There are four
possibilities:
1. participants(e, s) = participants(e′, s) = {Sk}.
Then e and e′ must be perform tasks of Sk , and so involve only the state of Sk . But then the states s0 and s1 can differ
only in the state of Sk . So s0 and s1 are k-similar—a contradiction.
2. For some i ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sk}.
Then the two tasks commute, that is, e′(s0) = s1—contradiction.
3. For some i ∈ I, participants(e′, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e, s) = {Sk}.
Again, the two tasks commute, that is, e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
4. For some i, j ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sk, Pj}.
By Claim 3, we know that i = j. Then again, the two tasks commute, so e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
Note that for cases 2 and 3 above, a situation may arise in which action(e, s) and action(e′, s) access the same buffer. In
this case, it must be that one action inserts an item and the other removes a different item. Hence the tasks commute. Note
that an action that removes an item first checks that the buffer is nonempty, and so cannot be executed if the buffer is empty.
Thus an empty buffer does not destroy the commutativity of the two actions.
Claim 5: There does not exist r ∈ R such that Sr ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s).
Suppose for contradiction that Sr ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s), for some particular r ∈ R. There are four
possibilities:
1. participants(e, s) = participants(e′, s) = {Sr}.
Then e and e′ must be perform tasks of register Sr . Without loss of generality, suppose that action(e, s) is performi,r
and action(e′, s) is performj,r . Since e = e′, we have i = j. We consider subcases based onwhether the two operations
performed are reads or writes:
(a) action(e, s) and action(e′, s) both perform read operations.
Then the two tasks commute, so e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
(b) action(e, s) performs a write operation.
Then states s0 and s1 can differ only in the value of inv−buffer(j)r and resp−buffer(j)r: in s1, an invocation
is missing from inv−buffer(j)r and an extra response appears at the end of resp−buffer(j)r , with respect to
inv−buffer(j)r and resp−buffer(j)r in s0. So s0 and s1 are j-similar—a contradiction.
(c) action(e, s) performs a read operation and action(e′, s) performs write(v).
Then e′(s0) and s1 differ only in the value of resp−buffer(i)r (different read responses may be appended at the
end). So e′(s0) and s1 are i-similar—a contradiction.
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2. For some i ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sr, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sr}.
Then the two tasks commute, so e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
3. For some i ∈ I, participants(e′, s) = {Sr, Pi} and participants(e, s) = {Sr}.
Again, the two tasks commute, so e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
4. For some i, j ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sr, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sr, Pj}.
By Claim 3, we know that i = j. Then the two tasks commute, so e′(s0) = s1—a contradiction.
Now Claims 3, 4, and 5 together imply that participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s) = ∅. But this directly contradicts
Claim 2. 
Proof. (Of Theorem 2)
Lemma5contradicts Lemma8. Sowehavederived a contradictionby assuming thenegation of Theorem2, andTheorem2
is established. 
4. k-Set-consensus
Theorem 2 says that it is impossible to solve (f + 1)-resilient consensus for any endpoint set I, using any (finite) num-
ber of canonical f -resilient objects, of any types, and any (finite) number of reliable registers. This is so even if we allow
arbitrary connection patterns between processes and services, so that no single set of f + 1 failures can “silence” all of the
services. Note that Theorem 2 concerns solutions to the consensus problem only; the situation is different for some other
problems.
For example, consider the k-set-consensus problem [6], in which the processes must agree on at most k ≥ 1 different
values (k-set-consensus reduces to consensus when k = 1). Analogously to our treatment of consensus, we specify the
f -reslient k-set-consensus problem as the canonical f -resilient atomic object of type k-set-consensus, for a given endpoint
set I. We say that a distributed system C solves f -resilient k-set-consensus for I if and only if C is an f -resilient atomic object (as
defined in Section 2.1.4) of type k-set-consensus, for endpoint set I, that is, if C implements the canonical f -resilient atomic
object of type k-set-consensus, for endpoint set I.
Here we describe a simple distributed system C that solves f -resilient k-set-consensus for endpoint set I = {1, . . . , n},
using only f ′-resilient k′-set-consensus objects with n′ endpoints apiece, for some particular choices of f , k, n, f ′, k′, and n′,
with f ′ < f . Since f ′ < f , this boosts resilience, and shows that Theorem2cannotbeextended, ingeneral, to implementations
of k-set-consensus.
Namely, we assume that k′n = kn′, f = n − 1, and f ′ = n′ − 1. We divide the n endpoints in I into g = k/k′ disjoint
groups, I1, I2, . . . , Ig , each with exactly n
′ endpoints. For each group Ij , we use a single f ′-resilient k′-consensus service Sj
whose endpoints are exactly Ij . Since each k
′-consensus service Sj is f ′-resilient and f ′ = n′ − 1, each Sj is in fact wait-free,
and so, it always returns a response. Each process Pi, i ∈ I, upon receiving an init(v) input, invokes the unique k′-consensus
service to which it is connected, with the same input v. It waits to receive a response, and then returns the same response to
its own environment, using a decide() output action. Since the implementation uses only g = k/k′ k′-consensus services, this
yields at most k distinct responses overall. The implementation of n-endpoint k-set-consensus is wait-free, i.e., it tolerates
up to n − 1 faults.
To be concrete, suppose that n is an arbitrary even number, n′ = n/2, k = 2, k′ = 1, f = n − 1, and f ′ = n/2 − 1.
Then this construction shows that wait-free n-endpoint 2-set consensus can be implemented from wait-free n/2-endpoint
consensus services.
5. Impossibility of boosting for failure-oblivious services
A failure-oblivious service is a generalization of an atomic object. It allows a perform step to depend on which endpoint’s
inv−buffer is being serviced. It allows a perform step to place any number of responses in any subset of the resp−buffers,
instead of just one response in the resp−buffer corresponding to the endpoint of the invocation. It also allows sponta-
neous compute steps, not triggered by a message in an inv−buffer; these may also place any number of responses in any
resp−buffers. The key constraint is that no step may depend on explicit knowledge of failure events.
In this section, we define the class of failure-oblivious services, give an example (totally ordered broadcast), and show
how Theorem 2 can be extended to failure-oblivious services.
5.1. f -Resilient failure-oblivious services
As for atomic objects, we begin by defining a canonical f -resilient failure-oblivious service. A canonical f -resilient failure-
oblivious service is parameterized by J, f , and k, which have the same meanings as in canonical atomic objects. However,
inplaceof the sequential typeparameterT , the servicehasa service typeparameter U ,which is a tuple 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob,
δ1, δ2〉. Here, V and V0 are as before, invs and resps are the respective sets of invocations and responses (which can occur
at any endpoint), glob is a set of global task names, and δ1 and δ2 are transition relations. A global task is used to perform
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Fig. 4. A canonical failure-oblivious service.
computation that involves invocations fromand responses to several processes. For example, in the totally ordered broadcast
example presented in Section 5.2 below, the computeg,k internal action (see Fig. 7) takes the first message in an internal
queue (msgs) and places it onto the response buffer of everyprocess that is connected to the totally ordered broadcast service.
This cannot be done by a performi,k action, which can only access the invocation and response queues for a single process,
namely Pi.
Letting ResponseMap denote the set of mappings from endpoint set J to the set of finite sequences of resps, we assume:
• δ1 is a total binary relation from invs × J × V to ResponseMap × V .
It is used in perform steps to map an invocation at the head of a particular inv−buffer, and the current value for val, to a
set of possible results, each of which consists of a new value for val and finite sequences of responses to be added to the
resp−buffers.
• δ2 is a total binary relation from glob × V to ResponseMap × V .
It is used in compute steps to map a value of val to a set of possible results, each of which again consists of a new value
for val and finite sequences of responses to be added to the resp−buffers.
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Fig. 5. Components of val in a totally ordered broadcast service.
Fig. 6. Relation δ1 in a totally ordered broadcast service.
Fig. 7. Relation δ2 in a totally ordered broadcast service.
The code for a canonical failure-oblivious automaton, showing specifically how these parameters are used, appears in Fig. 4.
Note (in the dummy_compute transition definition) that global tasks are allowed to stop performing steps when either the
total number of failures exceeds f , or all of the endpoints have failed.
Thus, a canonical f -resilient failure-oblivious service is allowed to perform rather flexible kinds of processing, as long as
processing decisions do not depend on knowledge of occurrence of failure events.
Notice that the canonical atomic object CanonicalAtomicObject(T , J, f , k) is a special case of the canonical failure-
oblivious service CanonicalFailureObliviousService(U, J, f , k): In this special case, the J, f , and k parameters are the same.
For a given sequential type T = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, δ〉, the corresponding service type U is defined as 〈V, V0, invs, resps,
glob, δ1, δ2〉, where glob = ∅, δ2 is the empty relation, and δ1 is defined as follows: δ1 is the set of pairs ((a, i, v), (B, v′))
for which there exists b ∈ resps such that ((a, v), (b, v′)) ∈ δ, B(i) is the sequence consisting of a single b, and B(j) is the
empty sequence for every j = i.
An I/O automaton A is an f -resilient failure-oblivious service of type U for endpoint set J and index k, provided that it
implements the canonical f -resilient failure oblivious service of type U for J and k, where “implements” is defined as in
Section 2.1.1. It follows that an f -resilient atomic object of sequential type T for endpoint set J and index k is in fact an
f -resilient failure-oblivious service of service type U for endpoint set J and index k, where the type U is derived from the
type T as described just above.
5.2. Example: totally ordered broadcast
Here we describe an f -resilient totally ordered broadcast service for a particular message alphabetM, endpoint set J, and
index k, as a special case of an f -resilient failure-oblivious service for J and k. To do this, we need only specify the failure-
oblivious service type U = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ1, δ2〉. Here, V consists of a single msgs queue, containing messages
that have been totally ordered, together with their sources (Fig. 5). V0 indicates that this queue is initially empty.
The invocation set invs is {bcast(m) : m ∈ M}. The response set resps is {rcv(m, i) : m ∈ M, i ∈ J}. Here, rcv(m, i)
indicates the receipt of message m from sender i. This receipt can occur at any endpoint. glob consists of one task name g,
that is, glob = {g}.
δ1, the relation describing the transitions that process invocations from inv−buffers, is defined implicitly in Fig. 6.
This code processes the first element of inv−buffer(i) by adding it to the end of the sequence stored in msgs. Formally,
δ1((a, i, v), (B, v
′)) holds if and only if a = bcast(m), v′.msgs is the result of adding (m, i) to the end of v.msgs, and B(j) is
empty for all j.
Relation δ2 is defined implicitly in Fig. 7. This code processes the first element of msgs by removing it from msgs and
adding it to the end of the sequence of messages stored in resp−buffer(j), for every j. Formally, δ2((g, v), (B, v′)) holds
if and only if either (a) v.msgs is nonempty, (m, i) = head(v.msgs), v′.msgs = tail(v.msgs), and for every j ∈ J, B(j) is
the sequence consisting of the single element rcv(m, i), or (b) v.msgs is empty, v′ = v, and for every j, B(j) is the empty
sequence.
Note that totally ordered broadcast cannot be implemented by an atomic object, since one invocation requires many
responses. Thus the notion of failure-oblivious service increases the range of systems that our framework can express.
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5.3. Impossibility of boosting
Now we show that Theorem 2 extends to the case of failure-oblivious services. The new theorem is:
Theorem9. Let I be a set of endpoints, n = |I|, and let f be an integer such that0 ≤ f < n−1. There is no distributed systemusing
only canonical f -resilient failure-oblivious services and canonical reliable registers that solves (f + 1)-resilient binary consensus
for I.
Proof. The proof follows the same outline as for Theorem 2. We sketch the modifications here. First, the index set K is now
the set of indices of all the f -resilient failure-oblivious services in C. The f -resilient failure-oblivious service with index k has
a service type Uk = 〈Vk, (V0)k, invsk, respsk, globk, (δ1)k, (δ2)k〉.
Lemma 1 extends to this case because the only relevantmodification to the service is the addition of the g-compute tasks.
These are defined using the total transition relation δ2. Since these are total relations, we see from Fig. 4 that these tasks are
always enabled. It follows that Lemma 1 still holds.
For determinism assumptions, we require the processes to be deterministic automata as before, and also require the
transition relations δ1 and δ2 to be (single-valued) functions. Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 and their proofs carry over without change,
since they do not depend on the definition of a service. The similarity definitions are the same as before, except that the
services Sk are now failure-oblivious services instead of atomic objects.
For Lemmas 6, 7, and 8, we provide complete proofs in Appendix A. Here, we just sketch the changes. For Lemma 6, the
execution fragments γ ′ and γ ′′ now may contain computeg,k actions. We argue that these do not invalidate the inductive
argument that shows the correspondence between γ ′ and γ ′′.
For Lemma 7, the proof requires very little change. Service Sk performs no locally controlled actions, including computeg,k
actions, in either γ ′ or γ ′′, and all other services and processes behave the same in γ ′ and γ ′′. The changes to the defin-
ition of Sk do not affect the proof, since the original proof of Lemma 7 does not depend on the detailed definitions of the
services.
For Lemma 8, Claims 1, 2, 3, and 5 carry overwith no change, since their proofs do not involve the details of the definitions
of atomic objects or failure-oblivious services. For Claim4, the proof of case 1 (participants(e, s) = participants(e′, s) = {Sk})
ismodified by considering g-compute tasks aswell as i-perform tasks. The proofs of the other cases carry over directly. Hence
the lemma as a whole carries over. 
6. Impossibility of boosting for general (failure-aware) services
A general, or (potentially) failure-aware service is a further generalization of a failure-oblivious service. As for failure-
oblivious services, a general service has both perform and compute steps. The difference is that a general service does not
have the failure-oblivious constraint: its decisions may depend on knowledge of past failures of processes connected to the
service.
In this section, we define the class of general services, give examples, and showhow Theorems 2 and 9 can be extended to
such services. The extension is weaker than the previous theorems, in that it requires a constrained connection pattern: all
processesmust be connected to all general services.We show by example that this constraint is needed: without it, boosting
is sometimes possible.
6.1. f -Resilient general services
A canonical f -resilient general service is parameterized by J, f , and k, which have the same meanings as for canonical
atomic objects and canonical failure-oblivious services, and by a service type parameter U , which is a tuple of the form
〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ1, δ2〉, as for failure-oblivious services. This time, however:
• δ1 is a total binary relation from invs × J × V × 2I to ResponseMap × V .
As for failure-oblivious services, δ1 is used in perform steps. The final argument, of type 2
I , is instantiated in the perform
code with the current failed set.
• δ2 is a total binary relation from glob × V × 2I to ResponseMap × V .
As for failure-oblivious services, δ2 is used in compute steps. The final argument is again instantiated in the compute code
with the current failed set.
We call the new service CanonicalGeneralService(U, J, f , k). The only portions of its code that differ from those for
CanonicalFailureObliviousService(U, J, f , k) are the two transition definitions that use δ1 and δ2; the new ones appear in
Fig. 8.
Notice that the canonical failure-oblivious service CanonicalFailureObliviousService(U, J, f , k) is a special case of the
canonical general service CanonicalGeneralService(U ′, J, f , k), with the same J, f , and k parameters. For a given service
type U = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ1, δ2〉 for a canonical failure-oblivious service, the corresponding service type U ′ for a
944 P. Attie et al. / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 927–950
Fig. 8. Relations δ1 and δ2 in a canonical f -resilient general service.
Fig. 9. Relation δ2 in P .
canonical general service is defined as 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ′1, δ′2〉, where δ′1 is the set of pairs ((a, i, v, F), (B, v′)) such
that ((a, i, v), (B, v′)) ∈ δ1, and δ′2 is the set of pairs ((g, v, F), (B, v′)) such that ((g, v), (B, v′)) ∈ δ2.
An I/O automaton A is an f -resilient general service of type U for endpoint set J and index k, provided that it implements
the canonical f -resilient general service of type U for J and k.
6.2. Examples: failure detectors
In this section, we describe how two well-known failure detectors [4,5] can be modeled as general services. Our failure
detectors do not provide all the functionality of the standard model [4]; most notably, because our failure detectors are
modeled as automata, they cannot predict future input actions and their output can only depend on the order in which
failures take place, and not on the timing of failures. We conjecture that our framework allows for describing the subset of
realistic failure detectors [7] that are “time-independent,” i.e., depend only on the relative order of failures.
All of our failure detector services have empty invs sets, that is, their only inputs are faili actions.
6.2.1. Perfect failure detector P
Aperfect failure detector is supposed toprovide all its endpointswith recent, accurate information aboutwhich endpoints
have failed. We define an f -resilient perfect failure detector for J and k as a canonical f -resilient general service of type
U = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ1, δ2〉. Here, V contains only one (trivial) state v¯, that is, the service maintains no internal
information other than the failed set. As noted above, invs = ∅. Responses are of the form suspect(J′), J′ ⊆ J. The set glob of
global task names is simply J—that is, it contains exactly one task name for each endpoint in J. Since there are no invocations,
δ1 is trivial.
It remains to define δ2,which describes the generation of suspect responses for particular endpoints. δ2(i, v¯, failed) simply
puts a suspect response containing the current failed set into i’s response buffer. Formally, δ2((i, v¯, failed), (B, v¯)) holds iff
B(i) is the sequence consisting of the single element suspect(failed) and for every j ∈ J − {i}, B(j) is the empty sequence.
Fig. 9 shows compute code that uses δ2 implicitly.
6.2.2. Eventually perfect failure detectorP
An eventually perfect failure detector is supposed to provide all its endpoints with information about which endpoints
have failed. This information may be erroneous for some finite amount of time, but eventually it is supposed to stabilize
so that thereafter, it is recent and accurate. We define an f -resilient eventually perfect failure detector for J and k, as a
canonical f -resilient general service of type U = 〈V, V0, invs, resps, glob, δ1, δ2〉. Here, V consists of valuations for a single
mode variable, which takes on values in {perfect, imperfect}. V0 assignsmode the value imperfect. Fig. 10 contains an implicit
definition of V and V0.
As before, invs = ∅. Responses are of the form suspect(J′), J′ ⊆ J. Since there are no invocations, δ1 is trivial. Now
glob = J∪{g}, so we have one global task name per endpoint plus one special task name g. Global task i, i ∈ J, is responsible
for generating suspect responses for endpoint i, while global task g is a background task that is responsible for eventually
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Fig. 10. The components of val inP .
Fig. 11. Internal transitions inP .
switchingmode to perfect.Whilemode is imperfect, the servicemay generate arbitrary suspect responses; aftermode becomes
perfect, the responses must be recent and accurate.
We define δ2 implicitly, in the compute transition definitions in Fig. 11.
6.3. Impossibility of boosting
Our impossibility results for atomic objects and failure-oblivious services allow arbitrary connections between processes
and services. However, it turns out that it is possible to boost the resilience of systems containing failure-aware services, if
we allow arbitrary connection patterns.
For example, consider an n-process system that useswait-free registers and 1-resilient canonical perfect failure detectors.
Suppose that every pair of processes share a 1-resilient 2-process failure detector. Such a system can implement a wait-
free perfect failure detector for all n processes as follows: process i just listens to all failure detectors it is connected to
and accumulates the set of suspected processes in a dedicated register. Periodically, it reads these dedicated registers and
outputs the union of all sets of suspected processes. By the definition of 1-resilient 2-process perfect failure detectors, the
2-process services continually provide each process with accurate failure information about each other process. Therefore,
the algorithm allows each process to continually provide accurate failure information about all n processes, as required by
the definition of a wait-free n-process perfect failure detector. Using this construction, f -resilient consensus, for any f , can
be implemented using wait-free registers and 1-resilient failure detector services.
Boosting is, however, impossible if we assume a system in which f -resilient failure-aware services must be connected to
all processes, and so, any f + 1 process failures can disable all the failure-aware services.
Weobtain the following theorem;notice thatweallow f -resilient failure-oblivious services, each connected to anarbitrary
set of processes, in addition to general services connected to all processes.
Theorem 10. Let I be a set of endpoints, n = |I|, and let f be an integer such that 0 ≤ f < n − 1. There is no distributed
system using only (a) canonical f -resilient general services connected to all processes, (b) canonical f -resilient failure-oblivious
services (connected to arbitrary processes), and (c) canonical reliable registers (connected to arbitrary processes) that solves
(f + 1)-resilient binary consensus for I.
Proof. The proof follows the same outline as for Theorem 9, based on similarity and the “hook” construction. The key new
fact is that, when we fail f + 1 processes in the proof of Lemma 6 or 7, we can “silence” all the failure-aware services.
The index set K is nowpartitioned into K1∪K2, where K1 is the set of indices of all the f -resilient failure-oblivious services
and K2 is the set of indices of the f -resilient general services. Lemma 1 extends easily. For determinism assumptions, we
require the processes to be deterministic automata, and also require the transition relations δ1 and δ2 to be (single-valued)
functions. Lemmas 3, 4, and 5, and their proofs carry over without change from Section 5.3.
The similarity definitions now change so that they do not restrict the states of failure-aware services, that is, failure-aware
services can have arbitrary states in s0 and s1. More precisely, let j ∈ I and let s0 and s1 be states of C. Then s0 and s1 are
j-similar if the following hold:
(1) For every i ∈ I − {j}, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(2) For every c ∈ K1 ∪ R:
946 P. Attie et al. / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 927–950
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1.
2. For every i ∈ Jc − {j}, the value of buffer(i)c is the same in s0 and s1.
Note that we do not restrict the states for c ∈ K2, that is, for the general services.
Also, let k ∈ K , and let s0 and s1 be states of C. Then s0 and s1 are k-similar if the following hold:
(1) For every i ∈ I, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(2) For every c ∈ (K1 − {k}) ∪ R, the state of Sc is the same in s0 and s1.
Again, we do not restrict the states for c ∈ K2, that is, general services. For k ∈ K1, this definition implies that all failure-
oblivious services except for k have the same state in s0 and s1. For k ∈ K2, this definition implies that all failure-oblivious
services have the same state in s0 and s1.
Lemma 6 is stated as before, and the proof requires only small modifications to the corresponding proof for the failure-
oblivious case. Now when we fail the f + 1 processes in J in β , in addition to the other constraints on β , we require every
failure-aware service to stop performing (non-dummy) locally controlled steps; we can do this because the f + 1 failed
processes are all connected to every failure-aware service. Then, following the strategy in the proof of Lemma 6 for the
failure-oblivious case, we construct a failure-free extension γ ′ of α0, α0 · γ ′, such that: (1) γ ′ includes no output actions
of process Pi, nor any performi or outputi actions for any service, for i ∈ J, (2) γ ′ includes no locally controlled actions of
any failure-aware service, and (3) γ ′ includes decide(v)l , for some l ∈ I − J. Then we show that (essentially the same) γ ′
can be appended to α1, which contradicts the assumption that α0 and α1 have opposite valences. In showing that γ
′ can be
appended to α1, we use arguments like those in the proof of Lemma 6 for the failure-oblivious case. Since γ
′ contains no
locally controlled actions of any failure-aware services, the new definitions for the perform and compute steps, in particular,
their ability to observe the set of failed processes, make no difference.
Lemma 7 is also stated as before, although now the set K mentioned in the lemma is the union K = K1 ∪ K2 of indices
of failure-oblivious and general services. In the proof, when we fail the f + 1 processes in J in β , we also require every
failure-aware service to stop performing (non-dummy) locally controlled steps. Then, following the strategy in the proof of
Lemma 7 for the failure-oblivious case, we construct a failure-free extension γ ′ of α0, α0 · γ ′, such that: (1) γ ′ includes no
locally controlled actions of service Sk , (2) γ
′ includes no locally controlled actions of any failure-aware service, and (3) γ ′
includes decide(v)l , for some l ∈ I− J. Thenwe show that γ ′ is essentially applicable toα1, which contradicts the assumption
that α0 and α1 have opposite valences. In showing that γ
′ is applicable to α1, we use arguments like those in the proof of
Lemma 7 for the failure-oblivious case. Again, since γ ′ contains no locally controlled actions of any failure-aware services,
the new definitions for the perform and compute steps make no difference.
For Lemma8, note that noneof the executions comprising thehook contain any faili actions.Hence at all states in thehook,
the set failed of failed processes is empty. Thus, the new definitions for the perform and compute steps, in particular, their
ability to observe the set of failedprocesses,makesnodifference.Hence theproof is unchanged fromthat for failure-oblivious
services. 
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a new framework for describing asynchronous distributed systems that use resilient
services to implement other resilient services. The framework is general enough to describe atomic objects, other failure-
oblivious services, and failure-aware services. To our knowledge, this is the first framework that can describe all of these.
Within our framework,wehave established the impossibility of boosting the resilience of services. Specifically,we proved
that f -resilient atomic objects, and more generally, f -resilient failure-oblivious services, cannot be used to solve (f + 1)-
resilient consensus. This is so even if processes can be connected to services using an arbitrary connection pattern. We have
also proved that f -resilient failure-aware services cannot be used to solve (f + 1)-resilient consensus; however, this proof,
and in fact this result, require that all processes be connected to all failure-aware services. Our results can be viewed as
generalizations, to any number f of failures, of the impossibility result of Fischer et al. [8] for the case f = 0. We emphasize
that the result of Fischer et al. [8] does not imply our results, since the model of distributed systems used in [8] does not
contain fault-tolerant services, and so the issue of boosting an existing nontrivial (f > 0) degree of fault-tolerance cannot
be directly addressed in the framework of [8].
Our proofs are short, simple, and self-contained. They use techniques inspired by those in [8], in particular, bivalence and
a “hook” construction. As a new addition to the proof method, we extract notions of “similarity” for processes and services,
which describe relationships between states that ensure that they must lead to the same decision value. Our lemmas about
similarity encapsulate reasoning about executions and valence, so that themain proof can focus exclusively onwhat happens
in a few individual steps.
The consensus problem is a natural benchmark to use for measuring the resilience of services because it has already
been shown to be fundamental to the study of resilience in distributed systems. In fact, this choice is crucial because our
non-boosting results do not apply to some problems that are weaker than consensus, such as k-set-consensus.
As observed in [9,13], a variant of Theorem 2, for atomic objects, can be derived indirectly, by a chain of existing results in
the literature [3,11,14]. However, thesemodels differ in some technical aspects. Our self-contained proof is simpler than the
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indirect proof, if we take into account the complexity of the proofs of the constituent pieces. Our proof also extends readily
to more general services than atomic objects. Our results for more general services are the first such results to appear.
This paper suggests several directions for future work. First, we have classified services in a hierarchy, as atomic objects,
failure-oblivious services, and general (possibly failure-aware) services. Are there interesting refinements to this hierarchy?
In particular, are there any interesting service classifications between failure-oblivious services and general services? If so,
what boosting results apply to these services?
Also, our framework can be used to address the general question of which services can be used to implementwhich other
services,withwhich levels of resilience. Thus, it could be used as the foundation for a general theory of relative computability
of resilient services. Some results that would fit into such a theory already appear in the literature (e.g., [3,11]). It remains
to develop a more complete theory.
Appendix A. Detailed proofs of main lemmas for failure-oblivious services
We present the proof of Lemma 6 for f -resilient failure-oblivious services.
Lemma 6. Let j ∈ I. Let α0 and α1 be finite failure-free input-first executions, s0 and s1 the respective final states of α0 and α1.
Suppose that s0 and s1 are j-similar. If α0 and α1 are univalent, then they have the same valence.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Fix j, α0, α1, s0, and s1 as in the hypotheses of the lemma, and suppose (without loss
of generality) that α0 is 0-valent and α1 is 1-valent. Let J ⊆ I be any set of indices such that j ∈ J and |J| = f + 1. Since
f < n − 1 by assumption, we have |J| < n, and so I − J is nonempty.
Consider a fair extension of α0, α0 · β , in which the first f + 1 actions of β are faili, i ∈ J, and no other fail actions occur
in β . Note that, for every i ∈ J, β contains no output actions of Pi. Assume that in β , no performi,c or bi,c action of any i ∈ J
occurs at any component c ∈ K ∪R; wemay assume this because, for each i ∈ J, action faili enables a dummy action in every
i-perform and i-output task of every service and register. Note that computeg,k and dummy_computeg,k actions may occur in
β , for k ∈ K .
Sinceα0 is a failure-free input-first execution, the resulting extensionα0 ·β is a fair input-first execution containing f +1
failures. Therefore, by the termination property for (f + 1)-resilient consensus and the fact that I − J is nonempty, there is
a finite prefix of α0 · β , which we denote by α0 · γ , that includes decide(v)l for some l /∈ J and v ∈ {0, 1}. Construct α0 · γ ′,
where γ ′ is obtained from γ by removing the faili action and all subsequent internal actions of Pi, for every i ∈ J, plus all
dummy actions, The dummy actions removed include the dummy_computeg,k actions, as well as the dummy_performi,k and
dummy_outputi,k actions. Thus, α0 · γ ′ is a failure-free extension of α0 that includes decide(v)l . Since α0 is 0-valent, vmust
be equal to 0.
Note that computeg,k actions, but not dummy_computeg,k actions, may occur in γ
′, for k ∈ K .
Next, we claim that decide(0)l occurs in the suffix γ
′, rather than in the prefix α0. The argument is exactly as before.
Now we show how to append essentially the same γ ′ after α1. The definition of j-similarity and the fact that j ∈ J imply
that:
(a) For every i /∈ J, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(b) For every c ∈ K ∪ R,
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1 (that is, in the final states of α0 and α1).
2. For every i ∈ Jc − J, the value of buffer(i)c is the same in s0 and s1.
We know that, for every i ∈ J, γ ′ contains no locally controlled actions of Pi, and contains no performi,c or bi,c actions,
for any c ∈ K ∪ R. Therefore:
(c) If γ ′ contains any locally controlled actions of a process Pi, then the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1 (since i /∈ J in this
case).
(d) For every c ∈ K ∪ R,
1. The value of valc is the same in s0 and s1.
2. For every i ∈ Jc , if γ ′ contains any performi,c or bi,c (b ∈ respsc) actions, then the value of buffer(i)c is the same in
s0 and s1 (since i /∈ J in this case).
Then it is possible to append “essentially” the same γ ′ after α1, resulting in a failure-free extension of α1 that includes
decide(0)l . Since α1 is 1-valent, this is a contradiction.
More precisely, we append another execution fragment γ ′′ after α1—the one that is generated by applying, after α1, the
same sequence ρ of tasks that generates γ ′. We can prove, by induction on the number of tasks, that when ρ is applied after
α0 and α1, in each pair of corresponding states: (a) for each i ∈ I for which the unique task of Pi occurs in ρ , the states of Pi
are the same, (b) for each c ∈ K ∪ R, the values of valc are the same, and (c) for each c ∈ K ∪ R and each i ∈ Jc such that an
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i-perform or i-output task of Sc occurs in ρ , the values of buffer(i)c are the same. This correspondence is enough to imply
that γ ′′ also includes the required decide(0)l action.
Notice that the possible presence of g-compute tasks in ρ does not invalidate the inductive argument. Since α1 · γ ′′
contains no failures, each g-compute task of each failure-oblivious service Sk is always applicable, and its results (new valk
and sequences to append to the resp−buffers) depend only on valk . This is enough to preserve properties (a)–(c) above. 
Next, we present the proof of Lemma 7 for failure-oblivious services.
Lemma 7. Let k ∈ K. Let α0 and α1 be finite failure-free input-first executions, s0 and s1 the respective final states of α0 and α1.
Suppose that s0 and s1 are k-similar. If α0 and α1 are univalent, then they have the same valence.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Fix k, α0, α1, s0, and s1 as in the hypotheses of the lemma, and suppose (without loss
of generality) that α0 is 0-valent and α1 is 1-valent. Let J ⊆ I be any set of indices such that |J| = f + 1, and, if |Jk| ≤ f + 1,
then Jk ⊆ J, whereas if |Jk| > f + 1, then J ⊆ Jk.
Consider a fair extension of α0, α0 · β , in which the first f + 1 actions of β are faili, i ∈ J, and no other fail actions occur
in β . Note that, for every i ∈ J, β contains no output actions of Pi. Assume that in β , no performi,k action, or bi,k action
(b ∈ respsk), or computeg,k (g ∈ globk) occurs; we may assume this because the f + 1 fail actions enable dummy actions in
all of the tasks of Sk .
Since α0 is a failure-free input-first execution, the resulting extension α0 · β is a fair input-first execution containing
f + 1 fail actions. Therefore, by the termination property for (f + 1)-resilient consensus and the fact that I − J is nonempty,
there is a finite prefix of α0 · β , which we denote by α0 · γ , that includes decide(v)l for some l /∈ J and v ∈ {0, 1}. Construct
α0 · γ ′, where γ ′ is obtained from γ by removing the faili action and subsequent internal actions of Pi, for every i ∈ J, plus
all dummy actions. Thus, α0 ·γ ′ is a failure-free extension of α0 that includes decide(v)l . Since α0 is 0-valent, vmust be equal
to 0.
Next, we claim that decide(0)l occurs in the suffix γ , rather than in the prefix α0. The argument is exactly as before.
Now we show how to append essentially the same γ ′ after α1. The definition of k-similarity implies that:
(a) For every i ∈ I, the state of Pi is the same in s0 and s1.
(b) For every c ∈ (K − {k}) ∪ R, the state of Sc is the same in s0 and s1.
We know that γ ′ contains no locally controlled actions of service Sk . Therefore:
(c) For every c ∈ K ∪ R, if γ ′ contains any performi,c or bi,c or computeg,c actions of Sc , then the state of Sc is the same in s0
and s1 (since c = k in this case).
By properties (a) and (c), it follows that it is possible to append “essentially” the same γ ′ after α1 (differing only in the
state of Sk) resulting in a failure-free extension of α1 that includes decide(0)l . But α1 is 1-valent—a contradiction. 
Finally, we present the proof of Lemma 8 for failure-oblivious services.
Lemma 8. G(C) contains no hooks.
Proof. We establish the same five claims as in the case of atomic objects, which establishes the needed contradiction.
Claims 1, 2, and 5 do not refer to the definition of an atomic object or failure-oblivious service, and so their proof remains
unchanged from the atomic objects case.
The proof of Claim 3 is also unchanged, since the only actions considered here have as participants either just a process
Pi, or else both a process Pi and a service Sc , c ∈ K ∪ R. Thus, whenever a failure-oblivious service Sk is a participant, the
action must be an external action of Sk . Since the external actions in the definitions of atomic object and failure-oblivious
service have the same effect, namely to add or remove a single item from a single buffer, it follows that the proof of Claim 3
for the atomic object case still applies.
We modify the proof of Claim 4 as follows:
Claim 4: There does not exist k ∈ K such that Sk ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s).
Suppose for contradiction that Sk ∈ participants(e, s) ∩ participants(e′, s). There are four possibilities:
1. participants(e, s) = participants(e′, s) = {Sk}. Then e and e′ must be i-perform or g-compute tasks of Sk , and so
involve only the state of Sk . But then the states s0 and s1 can differ only in the state of Sk . So s0 and s1 are k-similar—a
contradiction.
2. For some i ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sk}.
Then action(e, s) is either ai,k or bi,k , and action(e
′, s) is either performj,k or computeg,k , where j ∈ Jk and g ∈ globk .
Inspection of the definition of a canonical failure-oblivious service shows that the two tasks commute, that is, e′(s0) =
s1—a contradiction.
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3. For some i ∈ I, participants(e′, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e, s) = {Sk}.
Then action(e, s) is either performj,k or computeg,k, where j ∈ Jk, g ∈ globk , and action(e′, s) is either ai,k or bi,k .
Inspection of the definition of a canonical failure-oblivious service shows that the two tasks commute, that is, e′(s0) =
s1—a contradiction.
4. For some i, j ∈ I, participants(e, s) = {Sk, Pi} and participants(e′, s) = {Sk, Pj}.
By Claim 3, we know that i = j. Then action(e, s) is either ai,k or bi,k , and action(e′, s) is either aj,k or bj,k . Inspection
of the definition of a canonical failure-oblivious service shows that the two tasks commute, that is, e′(s0) = s1—a
contradiction. 
Appendix B. Proof that our definition of consensus implies the axiomatic definition
We now show that any system that meets our definition of consensus also meets the variant of the axiomatic definition
given in Section2.2.4.Weargue that the f -fault-tolerant canonical consensus object for endpoint set I satisfies the agreement,
validity, and modified termination conditions given in Section 2.2.4.
Theorem11. Let S be an f -fault-tolerant canonical consensus objectwith endpoint set I. Then every execution of S inwhich atmost
one input arrives at each endpoint satisfies the agreement, validity, and modified termination conditions given in Section 2.2.4.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary execution α of S. We show that α satisfies each of the agreement, validity, and modified
termination conditions. Recall that an f -fault-tolerant canonical consensus object has the sequential type binary consensus
given in Section 2.1.2.
Agreement condition. From the definition of the binary consensus sequential type, each endpoint in I has two invocations,
init(0), init(1), and two responses, decide(0), decide(1). Also, the value of the f -fault-tolerant canonical consensus object is
initially ∅, and on invocation init(0) changes from ∅ to {0}, and on invocation init(1) changes from ∅ to {1}, and is stable
once it is different from ∅. It is also clear that any decide(0) response is only issued by the consensus object when it has value
{0}, and any decide(1) response is only issued by the consensus object when it has value {1}. Hence, after the first decide(0)
response, all subsequent responses will be decide(0), and after the first decide(1) response, all subsequent responses will be
decide(1). So, α satisfies the agreement condition.
Validity condition. If all invocations are init(0), then theonlypossible changeof the consensusobject is from∅ to {0}. Hence,
all responses will be decide(0). Likewise if all invocations are init(1), then all responses will be decide(1). Otherwise, there
are both init(0) and init(1) invocations. Hence, in all cases, the value decided on is the value occurring in some invocation.
Hence, α satisfies the validity condition.
Modified termination condition. Assume that at most f endpoints fail along α, and that the scheduling along α is in accord
with the I/O automata fairness assumption, as discussed in Section 2.2.3. Consider any endpoint i that does not fail. If an input
occurs at endpoint i, then eventually a performi,k occurs (where k is the index of S), followed by a decide(v)i,k at endpoint i.
Hence α satisfies the modified termination condition.
Sinceα is an arbitrary execution of S, we conclude that every execution of S satisfies the agreement, validity, andmodified
termination conditions, as desired. 
We remind the reader that the modified termination condition is different from the traditional termination condition,
which requires that all nonfaulty processes do have an initial value, and that they all eventually decide. Here, only the
nonfaulty processes that receive an input will make a decision.
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